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In-migration and Dilution of Community Social Capital
1. Introduction and Background
The extensive literature on social capital demonstrates that it has many forms and
perspectives. 1 This diverse nature of social capital may have prompted Woolcock (2001, 7) to
declare that it has “become all things to all people, …” Lack of coherent definition of the concept
has led to formulation of different interpretations but fortunately these interpretations have more
in common than contradictions (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002). Putnam (1995b, 19) defines
social capital as interactions among individuals through social networks that lead to norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness. Putnam (2001, 22–24) also discusses two dimensions of social
capital: “bridging” networks and connections that bring different kinds of people together far and
near and “bonding” as networks that bring similar kinds of people together mostly locally.
Coleman (1988, 598) defines social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements
in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions
of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure." Knack and Keefer
(1997), while they do not provide an exact definition, use measures of trust at the country level
in explaining economic growth. Woolcock (2001) describes social capital as norms and networks
that facilitate collective action in the society. Portes (1998, 6), sounding a collective sentiment of
the above papers, defines social capital as “… the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of
membership in social networks or other social structures.” Rather than offering another
interpretation, following the above literature, we focus on social networks and interpersonal trust
that facilitate collective action as social capital.

1

See Durlauf (2002a) for a discussion of origins of the term social capital.
1

It is widely believed that high levels of social capital within a community can be thought
of as a local public good that generates positive externalities for members of the community.2
The many dimensions of social capital can produce benefits, for example, through higher levels
of trust (reducing transaction costs), more extensive social networks (improving efficiency of the
labor market, among other things), increased civic participation (resulting in more representative
governance), increased productivity (improving a firm's competitive advantage), and greater
participation in community organizations (strengthening goodwill), for example.3 It would stand
to reason, then, as argued by Schiff (1992), that high levels of migration (i.e., the disruption of
the social capital status quo) would dilute a community's level of social capital.4 Schiff (2002)
also argues that countries' tolerance of, even preference for, movement of goods and services
(i.e., trade liberalization) over their tolerance of movement of people (i.e., immigration) might be
rooted in the role migration plays in the dilution of social capital, or, rather, dilution of customs
and culture (also see Manole and Schiff 2013). Similarly, Antoci, Sacco, and Vanin (2007) argue
that increased population heterogeneity reduces social participation (taking the view that social
participation leads to social capital). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) present evidence that more
racially or ethnically heterogeneous communities have less social participation and those
individuals who express views against racial mixing are less likely to participate in social
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While most social capital activities would lead to social interactions that may result in
beneficial outcomes to wider society, there can be ‘perverse’ social capital as well (Rubio,1997)
that may result in socially undesirable outcomes (such as activities by hate groups and gangs).
3
Among many others, quantification of the positive contributions of social capital and its role in
society can be found in Hanifan (1916); Knack and Keefer (1997); Boix and Posner (1998);
Buonanno, Montolio, and Vanin (2009); Woolcock (2001); Biggart and Castanias (2001); and
Florin, Lubatkin, and Schulze (2003).
4
Hotchkiss and Rupasingha (2018) found that individuals are less likely to have migrated to
communities with lower levels of social capital than their own, perhaps because they fear a
dilution of their own personal social capital.
2

activities the more racially fragmented their community is. Several other studies discuss how
social capital is affected when people move from one location to another. Putnam (1995b, 669):
“mobility, like frequent repotting of plants, tends to disrupt root systems, and it takes time for an
uprooted individual to put down new roots.” Coleman (1988) discusses how the performance of
the children in school is affected every time a family moves. Several studies find that social
capital depreciates when individuals leave their community (Putnam 1995a; DiPasquale and
Glaeser 1999; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the notion that mobility and social capital
are inversely related, and, specifically, whether greater in-migration dilutes a community's level
of social capital. Controlling for potential endogeneity of migration in the determination of
community-level social capital, we find that higher-levels of in-migration are associated with
lower levels of social capital. If we have successfully accounted for the endogeneity, then we can
interpret this relationship as causal. While the central hypothesis, based on above literature, is
that social capital and migration are inversely related, due to multi-dimensional nature of the
concept, some aspects of social capital may be affected positively by in-migration. For example,
some forms of bridging social capital such as political activism and engagement by new migrants
in an area may be enhanced by new migrants to that area. In this study, we investigate the
impacts of in-migration on multiple dimensions of community social capital, some of which may
be more likely to be negatively affected by in-migration than others.
There are many studies of determinants of community level social capital and a few of
them address mobility or migration as a factor associated with social capital (for example see
Glaeser 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006;
Lesage and Ha 2012). However an area's migration rate is not typically included as a determinant
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except by Lesage and Ha (2012). Glaeser (2001) contends that individuals are less likely to
invest in social capital when they move frequently.5 Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) find
a strong negative relationship between the probability of moving and membership in
organizations. Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006) establish a strong positive relationship
between the share of a community’s long-term residents and production of social capital. Lesage
and Ha (2012) find that while in-migration has a positive effect on county-level social capital,
out-migration has a negative effect.
Another strand of literature studies the possibility that migrants may be attracted to places
of higher social capital (for example see Kan 2007; David, Janiak, and Wasmer 2010; Alesina et
al. 2015; Hotchkiss and Rupasingha 2018). Kan (2007) argues that interactions between friends
and family members in the neighborhood are sources for help when in need and generate positive
externalities such as low levels of crime and a better physical environment; these positive
externalities discourage residents from moving. Such benefits can also be accrued by
participating in neighborhood clubs (David, Janiak,and Wasmer 2010). David, Janiak, and
Wasmer (2010) also use local social capital to explain the differences in geographic mobility
between the North of Europe and the South of Europe and find evidence that social capital is
negatively associated with geographic mobility. Alesina et al. (2015) show how moving costs
will be high in societies that have stronger family ties and show empirical evidence to support
this argument. Hotchkiss and Rupasingha (2018) study how individual relative to community
social capital affects individual migration decisions and find that individuals are much less likely

5

Analogously, Glaeser and Redlick (2009) find that communities with high levels of migrants
will also invest less in social capital developments.
4

to have moved to a community with average social capital levels lower than their own and that
higher levels of community social capital act as positive pull-factor amenities.
This second strand of literature indicates that, in a more complete model of factors that
include migration affecting social capital, migration would itself be endogenous and would be
predicted to change as social capital changes. Therefore, any study that includes migration rate as
a predictor in social capital should address this endogeneity issue. However, this is not the case
of the studies discussed above. While controlling for potential endogeneity of migration in the
determination of community-level social capital, we make use of several indices of social capital
to incorporate the multi-dimensionality of the concept of social capital. Studies on social capital
determination discussed above focus on associational densities and/or civic participation as the
social capital measure. However, the wider literature suggests that social capital is not confined
to these specific measures and establishes there are multiple dimensions of social capital. In this
paper we incorporate several indices of social capital: religiosity, trust, political activism,
political engagement, community involvement, and sociability.
Various measures related to these dimensions of social capital have been used in the
literature of their impacts on social and economic outcomes. For example, several papers link
social interactions related to religion to social and economic outcomes (see for example, Barro
and McCleary 2003; Rupasingha and Chilton 2009; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). Trust
in others or interpersonal trust have been used as measures of social capital in many papers,
linking them to reducing transactions costs, enforcing contracts, and increasing government
efficiency (see for example Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997;
Paxton 1999; and Capello and Lenzi 2014). Political activism and engagement has been linked to
increasing government accountability (Knack, 2002) and federal spending (Levitt and
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Poterba,1999). The social capital field is overwhelmed with how social capital is enriched with
increased community involvement or when people belong to voluntary groups and associations
and participate in group and voluntary activities (see for example, Putnam et al. 1994; Knack
2002; and Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Several studies use interactions between friends and
family members in the neighborhood as measures of social capital (Kan 2007; David et al., 2010;
Alesina et al. 2015; Tselios et al. 2015). Finally, Hotchkiss and Rupasingha (2018) study the
effects of religiosity, trust, political activism, political engagement, community involvement, and
sociability on migration.
Religiosity is measured using several indicators: church or synagogue membership, how
often a respondent attended religious services, participation in church activities besides attending
service, and participation in an organization affiliated with religion. Trust measures are derived
from an individuals’ responses to questions on whether most people can be trusted, whether they
trust neighbors, how much they trust people in stores they shop, how much they trust people of
other races, how much they trust local news media, how much they trust local community police,
and the number of people each of them can confide in. Political activism includes activities such
as signing a petition, attending a political rally or meeting, participating in demonstrations,
boycotts, marches, participation in a political group, belonging to any group that took local
action for reform, and participation in an ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organization. Political
engagement includes activities such as whether the respondent read a daily newspaper, registered
to vote, and whether he/she voted in the last presidential election. Community involvement
includes measures such as participation in associations, groups, and volunteering activities. More
specifically these activities include an individual’s participation in a parent-teacher association or
other school support group, neighborhood association, social or welfare organization, service or
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fraternal organization, and how often an individual attended a public meeting that discussed
school, volunteered, or worked on a community project. And, lastly, sociability includes local
social activities such as interactions with friends and neighbors and participation in local sports,
arts, and other fun activities. More specifically the measures of sociability include individuals’
participation in a sports club, league, or outdoor activity, how often they had friends over to their
homes, how often they hung out with friends in a public place, how often they attended a parade,
local sports or arts event, how often they played cards or board games with others, how often
they took part in an artistic activity with a group, and number of close friends.
2. Methodology and Data
We make use of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census (DC) which contains a question about
whether or not individuals lived in the same house 5 years ago; if the answer is “no,” we
consider the individual as a "recent" in-migrant. We aggregate to the census tract level to obtain
an area’s rate of recent in-migration (the share of the current population that has moved to the
census tract within the past five years). We use data from the year 2000 since that is the year for
which we have measures of individual social capital activity from the Social Capital Community
Benchmark Survey (SCCBS). The SCCBS is a survey that was conducted by the Saguaro
Seminar at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and disseminated by the University of
Connecticut Roper Center for Public Opinion Archives. The SCCBS data contain 28,648
respondents across 5,187 census tracts, 3,017 of which have at least two respondents. We make
use of the restricted version of the SCCBS in which census tracts are identified. Since measures
of social capital are not contained in the DC, we use the SCCBS to estimate parameters for
variables determining social capital that we then apply to observations in the DC.

7

There are many candidates in the SCCBS to use as measures of social capital; for
example, the survey contains sets of question responses to measure a person's civic participation,
social trust, racial group trust, diversity of friendship network, group involvements (with and
without church participation), faith-based social capital, organized group interactions, and
informal social interactions. We estimate each person's probability of having a low, medium,
and high level of six measures of social capital. We then aggregate these probabilities to the
census tract level.
This process of using a secondary data set (the SCCBS) to estimate a non-existent
variable (social capital) for use in a primary data set (the DC) is often referred to as two-sample
two-stage least squares (Ridder and Moffitt 2007) and is described in detail in Appendix A. The
end result is that we end up with a measure of both migration and social capital for observations
in the DC that we can then aggregate to the census tract level. With these measures of recent inmigration and social capital we specify the relationship between mobility and social capital at the
census tract level.
!"# = %& + %( )5# + %+ !",# + %-. /# + %0 1)#23 + 45 ,

(1)

where, )5# is a measure of recent in-migration in census tract c. It is the share of individuals in
the census tract who indicated they had lived in their home for less than 5 years. !"# is a
measure of social capital in census tract c; 1)#23 are county level amenities; /# are average
demographic characteristics and other controls (such as state fixed-effects) in census tract c; and,
finally, !",# is a measure of the distance-weighted average SK in surrounding census tracts,
which is included to be able to isolate the effect of migration specifically on a narrowly
identified census tract, independent of the area’s overall social capital environment.
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There is a significant amount of literature suggesting that recent migration is potentially
endogenous to the determination of social capital -- either because in-migration is correlated with
unobservables in the model, or because a community’s level of social capital may act as an
amenity directly increasing an area’s in-migration (for example, see Hotchkiss and Rupasingha
2018). We expect the near-census tract social capital (!",# ) to remove some of this potential
endogeneity from the error term, but in addition, we apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimating strategy to instrument for recent in-migration at the census track level, as follows:
)5# = 6& + 6( !"# + 6+ )5,# + 6-. /# + 60 1)#23 + 67. 89# + :5 .

(2)

Recent in-migration is specified as a function of the community’s level of social capital and the
same community demographics and amenities defined for equation (1). In addition, recent inmigration to surrounding census tracts, )5,# , and economic conditions in the census tract, 8# are
included as unique regressors in the migration equation for identification purposes. Similar to the
argument for including !",# above, )5,# is included in the migration equation in order to
remove from the error term potential correlation of factors affecting migration patterns around
the census tract from characteristics of the census tract itself.
The first-stage involves estimating the reduced-form version of equation (2), which
includes all variables from equation (2) and equation (1), to obtain a predicted value for inmigration, which is then included in the second-stage estimation of the social capital equation:
< # + %+ !",# + %-. /# + %0 1)#23 + 45 .
!"# = %& + %( )5
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. This procedure is repeated six times for each
social capital category (religiosity, trust, political activism, political engagement, community
involvement, and sociability).
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(1’)

In order to account for both the high and low probability levels of each social capital
measure in the census tract, we construct what is referred to as the relative risk ratio. We use the
log of this ratio, which is approximately normally distributed of social capital in the census
tract:6
ABCD(FGHI5JK

!"# = =>? @ABCD(FGHLCM)O .

(3)

This ratio indicates the risk that a census tract has a high level of social capital relative to the risk
of having a low level of social capital.7 Consider the case of two census tracts that both have
probabilities of high social capital of 0.6. The probability of low social capital for the first census
tract is 0.1 and the probability of low social capital for the second census tract 0.4. If we just
modeled the probability a census tract has high social capital both of these tracts would look the
same when in reality they are actually quite different. This social capital measure is continuous
and falls between negative infinity and positive infinity.
The migration dependent variable in the first-stage estimation is the proportion of people
in a census tract who have lived in their home less than a 5 years. It is a continuous measure and
bounded by zero and one. Using a log transformation of the migration proportion yielded very
similar results, so we retain the linear probability construction for simplicity.
For measures of amenities, we utilize the US Department of Agriculture's Natural
Amenities Scale (see USDA n.d.). This county-level scale “is a measure of the physical
characteristics of a county area that enhance the location as a place to live.” This scale is created
taking into account a county's average January temperature, average number of sunny January

6

See (http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPHModules/BS/BS704_Confidence_Intervals/BS704_Confidence_Intervals8.html), as the measure.
7
A clear explanation of the construction of a risk ratio and how it differs from an odds ratio can
be found in (Schnell 2016). Also see “Risk Ratios and Rate Ratios (Relative Risk)” (n.d.)
10

days, average low winter/summer temperature gap, low average July humidity, topical variation,
and water area as a proportion of the total county area.
Finally, the full set of average census tract characteristics included as controls can be
found in any of the tables in Appendix B, which contains the full set of second-stage parameter
estimates. The key regressor of focus to test the hypothesis that greater in-migration dilutes a
community's social capital is %( in equation (1'). Theoretically, dilution of social capital would
predict a negative sign for this parameter.
Table 1 contains the sample means for the full sample from the 2000 Decennial Census
and for census tracts only in MSAs and in non-MSAs. Roughly 80 percent of census tracts are
located in MSAs. In-migration is higher into MSA census tracts, and except for political
activism, political engagement, and community involvement, non-MSA census tracts have
higher levels of social capital. In other words, social capital related to religiosity, trust, and
sociability is higher in rural locations. This may be due to the fact that people in rural locations
are more family oriented and homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, race, and religion. More
ethnically homogeneous communities tend to have higher social capital related to local social
ties such as family and friends (Alesina and Giuliano 2010) and trust (Zak and Knack 2001).
Census tracts in MSAs, relative to those in non-MSAs, have higher average education levels,
more racial diversity, more single and younger residents, more amenities, higher unemployment,
and higher incomes.
[Table 1 about here]
3. Results
Since we have six measures of social capital (religiosity, trust, political activism, political
engagement, community involvement, and sociability), we have six sets of estimation results for
11

the social capital equation (1') reported in Tables B1-B6 in Appendix B. Each table reports
results for the full sample, then census tracts in MSAs and non-MSA's, separately. Results from
the first-stage estimation of the reduced form of equation (2) are not presented. Importantly,
however, the identifying regressors ()5,# and 89# ) are jointly statistically significantly different
from zero for all sets of estimations. All estimations include state fixed effects (not reported) and
the standard errors are clustered at the county level.
The results in Appendix B are generally consistent with the existing literature regarding
important determinants of community social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Glaeser,
Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). Generally, census tracts
with higher levels education and citizens register higher levels of all social capital characteristics.
Census tracts with higher levels of amenities had higher levels of social capital except on
religiosity in the full sample and MSA only sample, and on political engagement for the nonMSA sample. Conceivably natural amenities may have a positive effect on some dimensions of
social capital as some amenity sites such as local water bodies and mountains can foster both
bonding and bridging social capital.8 The rest of the demographics are related to the area's social
capital levels in varying degrees, depending on the social capital characteristic. Table 2 reports
the coefficients of interest for the question of the impact of in-migration on the census tract
average level of each social capital measure. Without exception, each measure of social capital is
negatively affected by higher levels of in-migration, which is consistent with Schiff's (1992)
hypothesis that higher levels of in-migration would dilute a community’s level of social capital.
[Table 2 about here]

8

Besser and Miller (2013) find that social capital is positively related to most amenities including
outdoor amenities.
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Translating the parameter coefficients into marginal effects is a bit tricky. Recall that the
measure of each census tract’s social capital used in the regression — trust, for example — is the
log of the ratio of the average probability that residents in that census tract have a high level of
trust to the average probability that residents have a low level of trust.9 This ratio is commonly
referred to as a risk ratio. Referring to the sample means in Table 1, and continuing to use trust
as the example, census tracts, on average are at roughly one times the risk of having a high
probability of trust versus low probability of trust.10 Non-MSA census tracts have a higher "risk"
for trust than MSA census tracts. We use the log of the risk ratio since the log is normally
distributed and has a range of negative and positive infinity. However, this complicates the
calculation of the marginal effect.
The coefficient on the migration regressor in the log risk-ratio equation for trust
is -0.4461. The marginal effect of a one unit increase in migration on the trust risk ratio (not the
log risk ratio) is -0.39 [-0.4461*exp(-0.4461*0.27), where 0.27 is the average in-migration for
the full sample]. This means that a one unit (100%) increase in migration results in a decrease of
0.4 times the risk of the CT having high vs. low probability of trust. Dividing by 100, then,
means that a one percentage point increase in migration results in a decrease of relative risk of
having a high probability of trust, on average, by 0.004, which is about a 0.4% decrease in the
average trust risk ratio for the full sample (0.004 divided by the average full-sample risk ratio of
1.072). In-migration has the largest negative impact on political activism. Using the same
calculation strategy, a one percentage point increase in in-migration results in an average 2.4%

9

A census tract’s average probability of having a high level of trust is the average of each
resident’s probability of having a high level of trust.
10
By comparison, on average, census tracts are about four tenths the risk of having a high
probability of political engagement relative to a low probability of political engagement.
13

decrease in the average census tract political activism risk ratio for the full sample.
Table 2 presents results from estimating equation (1') separately for census tracts in
MSAs and not in MSAs. As was mentioned earlier, and has been identified in the literature, nonMSA areas are more insular and community focused (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Rupasingha,
Goetz, and Freshwater 2006). We might expect that new entrants into these communities would
create greater disruption and, thus, have a greater dilution effect than into MSA communities.
We see from the tables that this is the case for religiosity, trust, and community involvement. In
contrast, the social capital characteristics of political activism, political engagement, and
sociability (marginally) are diluted more in census tracts in MSAs than in non-MSAs as
migration increases.

4. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper finds that higher levels of in-migration lead to lower levels of
community social capital. While the research does not identify a mechanism for this relationship,
others have suggested several sources. In-migration may increase a community's demographic
heterogeneity, which Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) have found to diminish the community's
level of social capital. Additionally, communities with high migration rates may not bother to
invest in social capital development (e.g., see Glaeser and Redlick 2009). And, since migrants
are less likely to have close family ties in their new communities, high levels of in-migration
may very well undermine feelings of trust (Kan 2007). While our findings are more in line with
the studies cited here, they contradict findings by Lesage and Ha (2012) in which they report that
in-migration has a positive effect on county-level social capital. This contradictory finding may
be due to various reasons including differences in social capital measures, the size of geographic
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units (tracts vs. county), estimation methods, and use of contemporaneous vs lag explanatory
variables.
Regardless of the mechanism, this paper also offers an additional explanation for
communities', sometimes hostile, objection to immigration (Schiff 2002; Manole and Schiff
2013). Opposition to immigration can be shown to be rooted in economic competition, cultural
prejudice, and redistributive financial pressures (Baerg, Hotchkiss, and Quispe-Agnoli 2018).
The results in this paper confirm that loss in community social capital may be yet another source
of opposition to immigration.

15

References
Alesina, Alberto, Pierre Cahuc, Yann Algan, and Paola Giuliano. 2015. “Family Values and the
Regulation of Labor.” Journal of the European Economic Association 13 (4): 599–630.
https://doi.org/10.1111/%28ISSN%291542-4774/issues.
Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. 2010. “The Power of the Family.” Journal of Economic
Growth 15 (2): 93–125. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-010-9052-z.
Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2000. “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3): 847–904.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger. 1992. “The Effect of Age at School Entry on
Educational Attainment: An Application of Instrumental Variables with Moments from
Two Samples.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 87 (418): 328–36.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2290263.
———. 1995. “Split-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Return to Schooling.”
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 13 (2): 225–35.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1392377.
Antoci, Angelo, Pier Luigi Sacco, and Paolo Vanin. 2007. “Social Capital Accumulation and the
Evolution of Social Participation.” The Journal of Socio-Economics, Essays on
Behavioral Economics, 36 (1): 128–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.011.
Asquith, Brian J., Judith K. Hellerstein, Mark J. Kutzbach, and David Neumark. 2017. “Social
Capital and Labor Market Networks.” Working Paper 23959. National Bureau of
Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23959.
Baerg, Nicole Rae, Julie L. Hotchkiss, and Myriam Quispe-Agnoli. 2018. “Documenting the
Unauthorized: Political Responses to Unauthorized Immigration.” Economics & Politics
30 (1): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12101.
Barro, Robert J., and Rachel M. McCleary. 2003. “Religion and Economic Growth across
Countries.” American Sociological Review 68 (5): 760–81.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1519761.
Besser, Terry L., and Nancy J. Miller. 2013. “Social Capital, Local Businesses, and Amenities in
U.S. Rural Prairie Communities.” Journal of Rural Studies 32: 186–95.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2013.06.004.
Biggart, Nicole Woolsey, and Richard P. Castanias. 2001. “Collateralized Social Relations: The
Social in Economic Calculation.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 60 (2):
471–500. https://doi.org/10.1111/1536-7150.00071.
Boix, Carles, and Daniel N. Posner. 1998. “Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on
Government Performance.” British Journal of Political Science 28 (4): 686–93.
Buonanno, Paolo, Daniel Montolio, and Paolo Vanin. 2009. “Does Social Capital Reduce
Crime?” The Journal of Law and Economics 52 (1): 145–70.
https://doi.org/10.1086/595698.
Capello, Roberta, and Camilla Lenzi. 2014. “Spatial Heterogeneity in Knowledge, Innovation,
and Economic Growth Nexus: Conceptual Reflections and Empirical Evidence.” Journal
of Regional Science 54 (2): 186–214. https://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12074.
Carroll, Christopher D., Karen E. Dynan, and Spencer D. Krane. 2003. “Unemployment Risk
and Precautionary Wealth: Evidence from Households’ Balance Sheets.” The Review of
Economics and Statistics 85 (3): 586–604.
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal
of Sociology 94: S95–120.
16

Currie, Janet, and Aaron Yelowitz. 2000. “Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?” Journal
of Public Economics 75 (1): 99–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00065-1.
David, Quentin, Alexandre Janiak, and Etienne Wasmer. 2010. “Local Social Capital and
Geographical Mobility.” Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2): 191–204.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2010.04.003.
Dee, Thomas S., and William N. Evans. 2003. “Teen Drinking and Educational Attainment:
Evidence from Two-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimates.” Journal of Labor
Economics 21 (1): 178–209. https://doi.org/10.1086/344127.
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions and
the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 64
(5): 1001–44. https://doi.org/10.2307/2171954.
DiPasquale, Denise, and Edward L. Glaeser. 1999. “Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens?” Journal of Urban Economics 45 (2): 354–84.
https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1998.2098.
Durlauf, Steven N. 2002. “Bowling Alone: A Review Essay.” Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 47 (3): 259–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00210-4.
Fang, Hanming, Michael P. Keane, and Dan Silverman. 2008. “Sources of Advantageous
Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market.” Journal of Political Economy
116 (2): 303–3502–303.
Florin, Juan, Michael Lubatkin, and William Schulze. 2003. “A Social Capital Model of HighGrowth Ventures.” The Academy of Management Journal 46 (3): 374–84.
https://doi.org/10.2307/30040630.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York:
Free Press.
Glaeser, Edward L. 2001. “The Formation of Social Capital.” Canadian Journal of Policy
Research 2 (January): 34–40.
Glaeser, Edward L., David Laibson, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2002. “An Economic Approach to
Social Capital.” The Economic Journal 112 (483): F437–58.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Charles Redlick. 2009. “Social Capital and Urban Growth.”
International Regional Science Review 32 (3): 264–99.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160017609336079.
Grootaert, Christiaan, and Thierry van Bastelaer, eds. 2002. Understanding and Measuring
Social Capital: A Multi-Disciplinary Tool for Practitioners. Washington, D.C: World
Bank Publications.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2003. “People’s Opium? Religion and
Economic Attitudes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (1): 225–82.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00202-7.
Hanifan, L. J. 1916. “The Rural School Community Center.” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 67: 130–38.
Hotchkiss, Julie L., and Anil Rupasingha. 2018. “Individual Social Capital and Migration.”
Working Paper 2018–3. Atlanta, GA: Federal Research Bank of Atlanta.
https://www.frbatlanta.org:443/research/publications/wp/2018/03-individual-socialcapital-and-migration-2018-03-16.
Inoue, Atsushi, and Gary Solon. 2010. “Two-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimators.” Review
of Economics and Statistics 92 (3): 557–61. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00011.

17

Kan, Kamhon. 2007. “Residential Mobility and Social Capital.” Journal of Urban Economics 61
(3): 436–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2006.07.005.
Keane, Michael P, and Olena Stavrunova. 2014. “Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the
Demand for Medigap Insurance.” Economics Papers from Economics Group,Nuffield
College, University of Oxford No. 2014-W02. http://scor.com/en/sgrc/economyfinance/low-rates-environment/item/3174/3174.html?lout=sgrc.
Knack, Stephen. 2002. “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the
States.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 772–85.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3088433.
Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1251–88.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997.
“Trust in Large Organizations.” The American Economic Review 87 (2): 333–38.
Lee, Young, and Roger H. Gordon. 2005. “Tax Structure and Economic Growth.” Journal of
Public Economics 89 (5–6): 1027–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.07.002.
Lesage, James P., and Christina L. Ha. 2012. “The Impact of Migration on Social Capital: Do
Migrants Take Their Bowling Balls with Them?” Growth and Change 43 (1): 1–26.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2257.2011.00575.x.
Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Poterba. 1999. “Congressional Distributive Politics and State
Economic Performance.” Public Choice 99 (1/2): 185–216.
Manole, Vlad, and Maurice Schiff. 2013. “Migration and Diversity: Human versus Social
Capital.” Review of International Economics 21 (2): 281–94.
https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12036.
Narayan, Deepa, and Lant Pritchett. 1999. “Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social
Capital in Rural Tanzania.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 47 (4): 871–97.
https://doi.org/10.1086/452436.
Paxton, Pamela. 1999. “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator
Assessment.” American Journal of Sociology 105 (1): 88–127.
https://doi.org/10.1086/210268.
Portes, Alejandro. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.”
Annual Review of Sociology; Palo Alto 24: 0_12.
Putnam, Robert D. 1995a. “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital
in America.” PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (4): 664–83.
https://doi.org/10.2307/420517.
———. 1995b. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy 6
(1): 65–78. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1995.0002.
———. 2001. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 1st edition.
New York, NY: Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster.
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1994. Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press.
Ridder, Geert, and Robert Moffitt. 2007. “Chapter 75 The Econometrics of Data Combination.”
In Handbook of Econometrics, edited by James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer, 6,
Part B:5469–5547. Elsevier.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1573441207060758.

18

“Risk Ratios and Rate Ratios (Relative Risk).” n.d. Accessed February 16, 2018.
http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPHModules/EP/EP713_Association/EP713_Association3.html.
Rubio, Mauricio. 1997. “Perverse Social Capital--Some Evidence from Colombia.” Journal of
Economic Issues 31 (3): 805–16.
Rupasingha, Anil, and John b. Chilton. 2009. “Religious Adherence and County Economic
Growth in the US.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72 (1): 438–50.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.020.
Rupasingha, Anil, Stephan J. Goetz, and David Freshwater. 2006. “The Production of Social
Capital in US Counties.” The Journal of Socio-Economics, Essays on Behavioral
Economics, 35 (1): 83–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.001.
Schiff, Maurice. 1992. “Social Capital, Labor Mobility, and Welfare: The Impact of Uniting
States.” Rationality and Society 4 (2): 157–75.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463192004002003.
———. 2002. “Love Thy Neighbor: Trade, Migration, and Social Capital.” European Journal of
Political Economy 18 (1): 87–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00070-2.
Schnell, Audrey. 2016. “The Difference Between Relative Risk and Odds Ratios.” 2016.
https://www.theanalysisfactor.com/the-difference-between-relative-risk-and-odds-ratios/.
Tselios, Vassilis, Inge Noback, Jouke van Dijk, and Philip McCann. 2015. “Integration of
Immigrants, Bridging Social Capital, Ethnicity, and Locality.” Journal of Regional
Science 55 (3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/jors.12160.
USDA. n.d. “USDA ERS - Natural Amenities Scale.” Accessed February 16, 2018.
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/natural-amenities-scale.aspx.
Woolcock, Michael. 2001. “The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic
Outcomes.” Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2 (1): 11–17.
Zak, Paul J., and Stephen Knack. 2001. “Trust and Growth.” The Economic Journal 111 (470):
295–321. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00609.

19

Table 1. Census tract level means for 2000 Decennial Census.
Variable
Full-sample
Recent In-Migration

0.2744
(0.1392)
1.249
(0.6259)
1.072
(0.7896)
0.4016
(0.3541)
0.9834
(0.7018)
0.9225
(0.6622)
0.9368
(0.3638)
0.7867
(0.4096)
0.2934
(0.1025)
0.2805
(0.0809)
0.218
(0.1641)
0.1041
(0.1803)
0.1264
(0.2322)
0.0567
(0.0897)
45.27
(4.581)
0.5813
(0.1455)
0.9278

Religiosity risk ratio
Trust risk ratio
Political Activism risk ratio
Political Engagement risk ratio
Community Involvement risk ratio
Sociability risk ratio
Census tract is in a MSA=0,1
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT other race non-Hispanic

Average age of CT residents
Share of CT residents who are married
Share of CT residents who are citizens
20

MSA
Sample

non-MSA
Sample

0.2863
(0.1459)
1.225
(0.6097)
.96
(0.7227)
0.4355
(0.3854)
1.016
(0.7528)
0.9666
(0.7275)
0.8919
(0.3575)
--

0.2303
(0.0994)
1.338
(0.6752)
1.484
(0.8836)
0.2764
(0.1425)
0.8618
(0.4472)
0.76
(0.2653)
1.102
(0.338)
--

0.2752
(0.1002)
0.2841
(0.0822)
0.2386
(0.1738)
0.1201
(0.1914)
0.1412
(0.2468)
0.0631
(0.0878)
44.80
(4.731)
0.563
(0.1509)
0.9139

0.3605
(0.0809)
0.2675
(0.0746)
0.1421
(0.0866)
0.0452
(0.1134)
0.072
(0.1561)
0.033
(0.0929)
47.01
(3.464)
0.6489
(0.0972)
0.9792

Variable

Full-sample
(0.1101)
1.138
(3.256)
0.0206
(0.0149)
0.7315
(0.175)
64,083

Average county-level amenities scale
CT unemployment rate (16+)
Share of CT whose income is ³ $30K
Number of Census Tracts
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MSA
Sample
(0.1184)
1.427
(3.407)
0.021
(0.0155)
0.7493
(0.1816)
50,414

non-MSA
Sample
(0.0424)
.0715
(2.339)
0.0191
(0.0119)
0.6657
(0.1284)
13,669

Table 2. 2SLS parameter coefficients for the impact of in-migration on community social capital
levels, full-sample, MSA, and non-MSA separately
Social Capital Measure
Religiosity

Full-sample
-0.1136
(0.1019)

MSA only
-0.1175
(0. 0983)

non-MSA only
-1.511***
(0. 1476)

Trust

-0.4461***
(0.1281)

-0.3626***
(0.1337)

-1.876***
(0.3017)

Political Activism

-1.409***
(0.1553)

-1.355***
(0.1631)

-0.8066***
(0.1718)

Political Engagement

-0.9420***
(0.0754)

-0.9442***
(0.0800)

-0.7117***
(0.1547)

Community Involvement

-1.043***
(0.1100)

-0.9821***
(0.1157)

-1.504***
(0.1945)

Sociability

-0.6861***
(0.1071)

-0.6486***
(0.1126)

-0.5903***
(0.2164)

Obs. (# of census tracts)
64,083
50,414
13,669
Notes: Complete 2SLS second-stage results can be found in Appendix B. Unit of analysis is the
census tract; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the county level.
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Appendix A: Estimating Social Capital for Observations in the Decennial Census
Before aggregating to the census tract level, we need to obtain estimates of individual
levels of social capital for observations in the Decennial Census (DC). This appendix describes
how we make use of the restricted Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) from
2000 to identify determinants of individual levels of six dimensions of social capital. Those
determinants are then used to predict social capital for observations in the non-public version of
the DC. The commonly applied technique of using one sample to obtain predictors for an
outcome to be applied to a second sample is called two-sample two-stage least squares (2S2SLS)
(Ridder and Moffitt 2007), made popular by Angrist and Krueger (1992, 1995).11 The individual
social capital estimates are then averaged to obtain social capital estimates at the census tract
level.
In 2000 the Roper foundation conducted a national survey, the Social Capital Community
Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), to gauge the level of a multitude of dimensions of individual
social capital. A more recent 2006 SCCBS survey exists, however it does not contain an
indicator for census tract, which is important for constructing an instrument for individual social
capital (see https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/2006-social-capital-community-benchmark-survey/).
We use the SCCBS as the source for estimating social capital determinants. Fortunately, the
SCCBS and the DC are fairly harmonious with respect to their measures of demographics. This
is fortunate, since we are restricted to those variables that are found in both surveys in order to
use the estimated parameters from one data set to predict social capital in the second.

11

Also see Inoue and Solon (2010) for the distinction between 2S2SLS and two-sample
instrumental variables (2SIV). Other applications of 2S2SLS can be found in Dee and Evans
2003), Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003), Currie and Yelowitz (2000), Fang, Keane, and
Silverman (2008), and Keane and Stavrunova (2014).
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A.1 Creating Weights to use in the SCCBS. Since we are predicting out of sample and
in spite of the fact that both the DC and the SCCBS are both national surveys, we are interested
in how the two samples compare in their distributions across demographics. In other words, we
want to be sure that the parameter estimates obtained from the SCCBS sample are likely to be
applicable, at least at the means, to observations in the DC. Both the SCCBS and DC surveys
contain individual weights designed to generate a random national sample. Using just the DC
provided weights, 96 percent of the weighted means of the common variables in the DC and
SCCBS are statistically different from one another at least at the 95 percent confidence level.
To estimate the social capital equation on a sample that is more representative of the DC
(for which the prediction will be made), we use an inverse probability weighting methodology,
akin to the one used in DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), in order to create a counterfactual
distribution of the SCCBS that is much more similar to the DC. This amounts to estimating, in
the combined DC and SCCBS samples, the probability of an observation being observed in
SCCBS, using as explanatory variables as many demographics and their cross-multiples as is
feasible:
Q(>RSTUVWXY>Z Y ∈ !99\!|/) = Λ(/ . R) .

(1)

The parameter estimates from this logit model are then used to construct the inverse probability
_`a b Dcd

ratio, (e_`a b Dcd, for each observation in the SCCBS. This is the re-weighting function used to
modify the individual weight provided in the SCCBS.
There is significant improvement using the inverse-weighted adjustment to the means in
the SCCBS. Using the constructed inverse probability weights, the percent of common variables
that are statistically different from one another is reduced to 64 percent, with 85 percent of the
re-weighted means of all variables being significantly closer to the DC mean than they were
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using the survey supplied weights (additional details of the means comparisons are suppressed
for confidentiality reasons).12
A.2 Identifying a Person's Unobserved Social Capital. We make use of factor analysis
to elicit the common factor from multiple questions related to a specific measure of social
capital. This type of analysis uses the responses to those questions in the SCCBS in order to
uncover a person's latent degree of social capital. From this analysis, we obtain a single value for
each person for each type of social capital. The questions from the SCCBS that are combined,
via factor analysis, to construct each social capital measure are contained in Table A1.
[Table A1 about here]
The factor, or latent measure, does not have an easy interpretation and are ordinal by
construct. We, therefore, translate it into a categorical value. We specify three “levels” of social
capital: high, medium, and low. We then estimate an ordered probit to determine the relationship
between a person's observable characteristics and their level of each type of social capital.
Creating three categories is, of course, arbitrary, but offers an easy interpretation for low,
medium, and high values.
A.3 Estimating Social Capital. Since the categories of each social capital measure are
ordered from lower to higher levels of the social capital variable in question, we estimate the
parameters of each social capital equation as an ordered logit. The probability that individual i,
living in census tract c, has social capital level k of type j (j=sociability, community involvement,
trust, political activism, political engagement, and religiosity) is formally expressed as:

12

A condition of accessing non-public data through the Federal Statistical Research Data Centers
is that all output is subjected to disclosure review by the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau
restricts the number of tables showing sample means that can be made public through this
process.
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g

QU[!"5 = h] = QU[jke( < %& + Α. /5 + B . o# + 45 ≤ jk ] ,

(A1)

where 452 is assumed to be logistically distributed and the estimated cutpoints j=1,2 separate
three possible outcomes k= low, medium, high for each type of social capital.
Regressors /5 reflect person i's demographics and o# are average census tract
characteristics for each observation. The theory is that the characteristics of those in close
proximity influence one's level of social capital. Potential key average characteristics are the
share of employment near the person's census tract employed in "social" occupations and in
social industries which include individuals employed as independent artists, performing arts, and
spectator sports (NAICS 856); by bowling centers (858); by religious organizations (916); by
civic, social, advocacy organizations and grantmaking services (917); by labor unions (918); and
by business, professional, and political organizations (919) (see Asquith et al. 2017; Rupasingha,
Goetz, and Freshwater 2006).
There is some concern, however, that characteristics in a person's census tract (o# ) may
be endogenous to that person's level of social capital. In other words, there are unobservable
factors both affecting a person's level of social activity and the location where that person has
chosen to reside. This potential for endogeneity is why average demographic characteristics in
surrounding census tracts (o,# ) will be used instead of the value of those variables in the
person's own census tract (o# ),. These surrounding characteristics will be inverse weighted by the
distance (from centroids) of the census tract from that person's census tract. Census tracts in the
person's own and surrounding states will be used to construct the average. This method of
construction of an instrument in the face of potential geographic endogeneity has been widely
applied in the empirical literature (for example, see Lee and Gordon 2005).
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The parameter estimates from the ordered logits are then used to predict the level of each
type of social capital for respondents in the DC, which are then aggregated to the census tract
level (predicted values for !"# and !",# in equations 1 and 2). Results from this first stage
analysis have not been disclosed in the interest of parsimony.
To apply the 2S2SLS methodology with some confidence (i.e., that our predicted social
capital levels in the DC are believable), our first stage estimation should demonstrate a good fit
of the data. While most studies using 2S2SLS spend very little time on this issue, we report the
goodness of fit for each ordered logit analysis in Table A2.
[Table A2 about here]
We do well, generally, predicting low and high levels of each social capital measure, but
not so well predicting a medium outcome. For example, in the SCCBS, nearly 68 percent of
those with an actual medium level of political activism were predicted with a low level.
However, the correlations reported at the bottom of the table, compare favorably with first-stage
R-squared statistics reported by others who have employed this methodology. Dee and Evans
(2003) make use of predictions from a first stage estimation with R-squared statistics less than
0.02; Carroll, Dynan, and Krane (2003) report first-stage adjusted R-squared test statistics
between 0.28 and 0.48; Currie and Yelowitz (2000) report a first-stage R-squared statistic less
than 0.1; Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) and Keane and Stavrunova (2014) contain similar
analyses using the same data and fist-stage R-squared statistics ranging from 0.02 to 0.25.
For each census tract, then, we calculate the share of individuals with high and low levels
of each social capital measure from which we then construct something like an odds ratio that
describes a census tract's probability of high, relative to low, levels of each social capital
measure.
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Table A1. Questions used to construct each social capital measure via factor analysis.
Variable from SCCBS
Community Involvement
GRPPTA
GRPNEI
GRPSOC
GRPFRAT
PUBMEET2
VOLTIME2
PROJECT
Sociability
GRPSPORT
FRNDHOM2
FRNDHNG2
PARADE2
CARDS2
FRIENDS
ARTIST2
Religiosity
RELMEM2
RELATEN2
RELPART2
GRPREL
Trust
TRUST2
TR2NEI
TR2SHOP
RACETRST
TR2NEWS
TR2COP
CONFIDE
Political Activism
PETITION
RALLY
MARCH

Description
Participate in parent association or other school support
Participate in neighborhood association
Participate in social or welfare organization
Participate in service or fraternal organization
How often attended a public meeting discussing school
Number of times volunteered
Worked on community project in past 12 months
Participate in sports club, league, or outdoor activity
How often had friends over to your home
How often hung out with friends in a public place
How often attended parade, local sports or arts event
How often played cards or board games with others
Number of close friends
How often took part in artistic activity with group
Church or synagogue member
How often attend religious service
Participate in church activities besides attending service
Participate in organization affiliated with religion
Whether most people can be trusted
How much trust neighbors
How much trust people in stores you shop
How much trust people of other race
How much trust local news media
How much trust local community police
Number of people you can confide in
Signed a petition in past 12 months
Attended a political rally or meeting in past 12 months
Participated in demonstrations, boycotts, marches
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Variable from SCCBS
GRPPOL
REFORM
GRPETH
Political Engagement
PAPER
REGVOTE
VOTEUS

Description
Participate in political group
Belong to any group that took local action for reform
Participate in ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organization
Days in past week respondent read a daily newspaper
Currently registered to vote
Voted in 1996 presidential election
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Table A2. Actual and predicted categories of social capital measures (goodness-of-fit) within the SCCBS data set.
VARIABLES
Religiosity
Trust
Political
Political
Community
Activism
Engagement
Involvement
Actual Level of Low
Predicted level of Low
45.21%
60.36%
85.22%
61.55%
54.76%
Predicted level of Medium
25.87%
24.13%
12.46%
30.94%
32.69%
Predicted level of High
28.91%
15.51%
2.32%
7.51%
12.55%

Sociability

59.96%
24.02%
16.02%

Actual Level of Medium
Predicted level of Low
Predicted level of Medium
Predicted level of High

29.72%
26.26%
44.02%

29.52%
33.18%
37.30%

67.93%
24.56%
7.51%

16.21%
52.91%
30.88%

32.39%
40.67%
26.94%

42.01%
30.57%
27.42%

Actual Level of High
Predicted level of Low
Predicted level of Medium
Predicted level of High

14.24%
21.53%
64.24%

14.25%
31.51%
54.25%

55.63%
30.52%
13.85%

6.86%
33.61%
59.54%

15.55%
34.29%
50.15%

26.61%
29.10%
44.29%

0.31

0.41

0.28

0.56

0.39

0.30

Correlations between actual
and predicted categories across
individuals
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Appendix B: Full Set of 2SLS Second-stage Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for
Social Capital Equations.
Table B1. Religiosity
Regressors:

Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

Recent In-Migration

-0.1136

-0.1175

-1.511***

(0.1019)

(0.0983)

(0.1476)

1.471***

1.473***

1.332***

(0.0422)

(0.0454)

(0.0467)

-0.0125***

-0.0153***

0.0004

(0.0025)

(0.0033)

(0.0018)

0.1512***

0.1623***

0.5832***

(0.0407)

(0.0453)

(0.0483)

0.6002***

0.5362***

1.443***

(0.0557)

(0.0535)

(0.0736)

0.5528***

0.5170***

1.609***

(0.0472)

(0.0454)

(0.0613)

0.7056***

0.7136***

0.3929***

(0.0329)

(0.0364)

(0.0319)

0.8890***

0.8780***

0.9187***

(0.0203)

(0.0210)

(0.0242)

0.0833***

0.0983***

-0.0099

(0.0290)

(0.0376)

(0.0304)

0.0344***

0.0407***

-0.0429***

(0.0065)

(0.0067)

(0.0101)

-0.0002***

-0.0003***

0.0005***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

1.197***

1.228***

0.7240***

(0.0264)

(0.0275)

(0.0508)

0.5397***

0.5691***

-0.4564***

(0.0545)

(0.0569)

(0.0998)

-2.967***

-3.038***

0.1288

(0.2058)

(0.2117)

(0.2938)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9332

0.9318

0.9493

Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

0.1001***
(0.0047)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-1

Table B2. Trust
Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

-0.4461***

-0.3626***

-1.876***

(0.1281)

(0.1337)

(0.3017)

1.123***

1.126***

0.8595***

(0.0376)

(0.0395)

(0.0533)

0.0097*

0.0147**

0.0037

(0.0054)

(0.0068)

(0.0023)

0.8589***

0.9183***

0.9032***

(0.0509)

(0.0549)

(0.0827)

1.249***

1.315***

1.575***

(0.0608)

(0.0635)

(0.1479)

1.949***

1.966***

2.231***

(0.0549)

(0.0560)

(0.1169)

-0.6768***

-0.6750***

-0.9316***

(0.0460)

(0.0534)

(0.0472)

-1.151***

-1.146***

-1.174***

(0.0235)

(0.0247)

(0.0276)

-0.4107***

-0.5007***

-0.4510***

(0.0414)

(0.0609)

(0.0317)

0.0407***

0.0455***

-0.0148

(0.0084)

(0.0093)

(0.0148)

-0.0001

-0.0001*

0.0004***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

0.8277***

0.8526***

0.3008***

(0.0330)

(0.0377)

(0.0524)

0.3555***

0.3036***

-0.5383***

(0.0730)

(0.0833)

(0.2016)

-2.693***

-3.028***

-0.0444

(0.2531)

(0.2792)

(0.5465)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9783

0.9779

0.9515

Regressors:
Recent In-Migration
Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

-0.1660***
(0.0057)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-2

Table B3. Political Activism
Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

-1.409***

-1.355***

-0.8066***

(0.1553)

(0.1631)

(0.1718)

1.323***

1.375***

0.7908***

(0.0603)

(0.0643)

(0.0406)

0.0139**

0.0178**

-0.0016

(0.0063)

(0.0082)

(0.0016)

0.7305***

0.7184***

0.6389***

(0.0709)

(0.0766)

(0.0490)

1.738***

1.660***

1.578***

(0.0756)

(0.0787)

(0.0821)

2.396***

2.357***

2.321***

(0.0907)

(0.0935)

(0.0682)

-0.1509***

-0.1318***

-0.2439***

(0.0433)

(0.0492)

(0.0297)

0.1739***

0.1789***

0.0856***

(0.0263)

(0.0282)

(0.0168)

-0.6634***

-0.6604***

-0.6179***

(0.0555)

(0.0758)

(0.0209)

-0.0191*

-0.0156

0.0124

(0.0098)

(0.0109)

(0.0083)

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

-0.0800*

-0.0848*

0.0323

(0.0451)

(0.0496)

(0.0308)

0.4362***

0.5073***

0.3648***

(0.0738)

(0.0758)

(0.1198)

-0.0268

-0.0131

-1.572***

(0.3337)

(0.3641)

(0.3053)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9275

0.9271

0.9644

Regressors:
Recent In-Migration
Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

0.0772***
(0.0070)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-3

Table B4. Political Engagement
Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

-0.9420***

-0.9442***

-0.7117***

(0.0754)

(0.0800)

(0.1547)

0.6657***

0.6383***

0.9774***

(0.0362)

(0.0367)

(0.0449)

0.0025

0.0027

-0.0038***

(0.0026)

(0.0033)

(0.0014)

1.323***

1.283***

1.345***

(0.0460)

(0.0574)

(0.0473)

2.056***

2.077***

1.908***

(0.0417)

(0.0455)

(0.0777)

2.699***

2.689***

2.620***

(0.0439)

(0.0502)

(0.0627)

-0.0786***

-0.0646**

-0.2191***

(0.0273)

(0.0319)

(0.0381)

0.1699***

0.1757***

0.1175***

(0.0162)

(0.0179)

(0.0152)

-0.8610***

-0.8575***

-0.7892***

(0.0358)

(0.0497)

(0.0221)

0.1149***

0.1105***

0.1415***

(0.0059)

(0.0064)

(0.0088)

-0.0006***

-0.0005***

-0.0008***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

0.4823***

0.4910***

0.5474***

(0.0311)

(0.0341)

(0.0360)

1.373***

1.413***

0.9541***

(0.0633)

(0.0707)

(0.1512)

-6.978***

-6.750***

-7.083***

(0.1634)

(0.1818)

(0.3177)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9683

0.9694

0.9736

Regressors:
Recent In-Migration
Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

0.1864***
(0.0041)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-4

Table B5. Community Involvement
Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

-1.043***

-0.9821***

-1.504***

(0.1100)

(0.1157)

(0.1945)

1.163***

1.169***

1.275***

(0.0697)

(0.0756)

(0.0512)

0.0130**

0.0152**

0.0043**

(0.0053)

(0.0067)

(0.0019)

0.4768***

0.4233***

0.8283***

(0.0455)

(0.0520)

(0.0616)

1.448***

1.337***

1.898***

(0.0489)

(0.0504)

(0.0905)

2.170***

2.104***

2.699***

(0.0587)

(0.0628)

(0.0823)

0.0194

0.0223

-0.2482***

(0.0393)

(0.0436)

(0.0386)

0.4133***

0.4226***

0.2421***

(0.0222)

(0.0236)

(0.0229)

-0.3885***

-0.4324***

-0.3340***

(0.0461)

(0.0551)

(0.0303)

0.0536***

0.0595***

0.0271**

(0.0071)

(0.0080)

(0.0113)

-0.0006***

-0.0006***

-0.0003***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

0.5619***

0.5960***

0.2158***

(0.0316)

(0.0339)

(0.0461)

0.7080***

0.7485***

0.0268

(0.0517)

(0.0522)

(0.1361)

-3.012***

-3.124***

-1.571***

(0.2229)

(0.2475)

(0.3772)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9183

0.9240

0.8661

Regressors:
Recent In-Migration
Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

0.0436***
(0.0049)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-5

Table B6. Sociability
Full
sample

MSA
only

non-MSA
only

-0.6861***

-0.6486***

-0.5903***

(0.1071)

(0.1126)

(0.2164)

1.102***

1.088***

1.376***

(0.0386)

(0.0424)

(0.0669)

0.0135***

0.0147***

0.0069***

(0.0028)

(0.0037)

(0.0015)

0.5738***

0.5913***

0.4194***

(0.0371)

(0.0409)

(0.0557)

1.122***

1.097***

1.032***

(0.0450)

(0.0465)

(0.1040)

1.257***

1.253***

1.112***

(0.0557)

(0.0581)

(0.0856)

-0.4495***

-0.4500***

-0.4605***

(0.0315)

(0.0353)

(0.0373)

-0.6430***

-0.6433***

-0.6869***

(0.0192)

(0.0208)

(0.0171)

-0.7822***

-0.7750***

-0.8442***

(0.0267)

(0.0330)

(0.0217)

-0.1109***

-0.1095***

-0.1052***

(0.0072)

(0.0080)

(0.0106)

0.0008***

0.0008***

0.0007***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

-0.2030***

-0.2047***

-0.2004***

(0.0299)

(0.0325)

(0.0336)

0.3082***

0.3326***

0.3294**

(0.0601)

(0.0617)

(0.1426)

2.842***

2.555***

2.872***

(0.2168)

(0.2378)

(0.3820)

Obs. (number of census tracts)

64,083

50,414

13,669

R-squared

0.9312

0.9295

0.9479

Regressors:
Recent In-Migration
Near Census SK level
Amenities Scale
Share of CT HS only
Share of CT SCOLL only
Share of CT COLL degree
Share of CT Hispanic
Share of CT black non-Hispanic
Share of CT oth. race non-Hisp
Average Age of CT residents
Average Age2 of CT residents
Share of CT who married
Share of CT citizens
CT is a MSA=0,1

-0.2132***
(0.0043)

Constant

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the county level.
B-6

